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ANDERSON, and JUDY ANDERSON, 
his wife, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants 
AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant and 
Respondant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
CASE NO. 18178 
This is an action for determination and declaration of the 
respective parties' interest in real property, being lot 17 A-D 
Westhampton Planned Unit Development. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted defendant's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment without explanation. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an Order reversing the Order of the District 
Court and for determination of the legal issue whether defendant 
has record priority because its recording number is lower. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties agreed to stipulated facts that include, by 
adoption, the status of the record of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's Office (R 12-18). The depositions of three of 
the defendants were taken and pliblished at the time of defen-
dant's Motion for Summary Judgment (R 81-154). There are also 
affidavits of Bruce Hancey, an employee of Utah Title .company 
(R 19-31); David c. Kimball, an employee of American Savings 
and Loan Association, the defendant (R 52-65); Clair H. Ander-
son, one of the plaintiffs (R72-73); and Dirk C. Anderson, 
another of the plaintiffs (R 74-75). 
Defendant brought a Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
plaintiff brought a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Both 
parties prepared extensive memoranda in support of their res-
pective Motions and in opposition to the Motion of the other. 
Defendant's memorandum is included in the record. Plaintiffs' 
memorandum, a copy of which was filed with the docketing state-
ment as a description of plaintiffs' claims as to the law, is 
not included in the record for reasons that are not clear to 
plaintiffs' counsel. A copy of said memorandum was in the 
hands of Judge G. Hal Taylor at the time of argument on the 
Motions for Summary Judgment. 
The facts are detailed in the Stipulated Statement of Facts. 
Plaintiffs will here recite in narrative form the most essen-
tial of those facts. They are: 
-2-
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PlGintiffs purchased unit #4, Westhampton Planned Unit 
Development from Great West Development Company. As part of 
the consideration, said seller agreed to construct a specific 
4-plex thereon for an agreed additional price of $95,000.00, 
which was advantageous to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs later agreed 
to forego that seller's agreement to construct the 4-plex for 
that advantageous price and to exchange lot 4 A-D for lot 17 
A-D for an agreed price, part of which was paid in cash and 
part of which was paid by Great West Development Company's 
promissory note secured by a trust deed on said lot 17 A-D. 
Larry Myers and others who were the principals of Great 
West Development Company gave defendant a trust deed for the 
peoperty, including lot 17 A-D. They did not have title at 
that time. The determination of the respective priorities of 
that trust deed and the trust deed of plaintiffs is what this 
lawsuit is about. 
The date of Great West Development Company 1 s trust deed 
to plaintiffs was April 30, 1979. By a deed bearing that same 
date, Great West Development Company conveyed title to the 
property described in defendant's trust deed to Larry Myers 
and others who were granters in defendant's trust deed. On 
the next day (May 1, 1979) both trust deeds and the conveyance 
by plaintiffs' granter (Great West Development Company) to de-
fendant's granter, Larry Myers and others, were recorded at ex-
actly the same time, to wit: 11:02 a.m. The recording number 
assigned to defendant's trust deed was lower than the one as-
signed to plaintiffs' trust deed. 
-3-
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The affidavit of Bruce Haney (R 19-31)_ claims that he 
was present when Larry B. Myers informed plaintiffs that their 
trust deed would be subordinate to defendant's trust deed and 
that he was instructed by defendant to record so that defen-
dant's trust deed would be prior. Plaintiffs did not partici-
pate in those instructions. Plaintiffs Clair H. Anderson and 
Dirk c. Anderson each denied having been told that their trust 
deed would be subordinate, and they each denied agreeing to or 
acquiescing in such subordination (R-72-75). 
In their depositions both Clair H. Anderson (R 117-154) 
and Dirk c. Anderson (R 81-107) acknowledged that they under-
stood that defendant wanted a first trust deed position, and 
each vigorously denied that he was told or that he agreed that 
their trust deed would be: subordinate. Both of said plain-
tiffs made affidavits explaining their· understanding of "First 
Trust Deed Position" was that it was necessary to get title to 
the entire development project in a common granter and that any-
one that granter gave a trust deed to would have a "first trust 
deed" even if that granter gave consecutive trust deeds (R 72 
and R 74}. Both of said plaintiffs corrected their depositions 
to indicate that understanding prior to signing them (R 108 and 
:R 145) • 
It is also important to note that while each of said 
plaintiffs said he knew defendant wanted a first trust deed 
position, (a fact each Plaintiff would still acknowledge) each 
also says that he did not agree that Defendant should have a 
-4-
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first trust deed position, and both of them vigorously resisted, 
in spite of defendant's counsel's badgering that they agreed to 
accept a subordinate position or that they were told that their 
position would be subordinate (R 99, lines 1-16; R 102, lines 
1-18; R 131, lines 9-12; and R 140, lines 1-5). 
Plaintiffs acknowledge that they understood that defendant 
wanted clear title to lot 4 A-D, the lot they exchanged for lot 
17 A-D,because that is where the developer intended to begin 
construction. 
The fourth cause of action of plaintiffs' Complaint is a 
claim that defendant agreed to loan monies for development of 
the property which was relied upon by plaintiffs when they agreed 
to exchange the lots and by others; that defendant knew of that 
reliance and, nonetheless, failed to loan all of the monies it 
had agreed to and that plaintiffs were damaged thereby. 
It is fair to say that plaintiffs' knowledge of the justi-
fication for defendant's failure to loan all of the monies it 
agreed to loan was deficient when their depositions were taken. 
They merely said they had been told the problems were due to 
Defendant's holding up on its draws. In their Memorandum on 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiffs advised the 
court of their desire and intention to do further discovery on 
that matter. (See plaintiffs' Memorandum attached to Docketing 
Statement, Point V.} The affidavit of David G. Kimball (R- 52 
and 53} described Defendant's disbursements in connection with 
the loan. It is not contradicted. 
-5-
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ARGUMENT 
I 
PLAINTIFFS' TRUST DEED IS PRIOR TO DEFENDANT'S TRUST 
DEED. 
Plaintiffs agreed to stipulate to the facts to test defen-
dant's contention that defendant's lower recording number was 
dispositive as against plaintiffs' contention that it had re-
cord priority or, at the worst, record parity. On that matter, 
the facts are contained in the records of the county recorder's 
off ice, unchangeable and largel.y uncolorable by either party. 
Plaintiffs asked the District Court to make a determination of 
that issue and now ask this Court to make that determination or 
to instruct the lower court to do so. If the matter is to be 
determined on the basis of either the silent or expressed in-
tention of the parties, there is a factual dispute which will 
require a trial. That matter will be argued more fully in 
Argument IV. 
On the record, plaintiffs received their trust deed from 
Great West Development Company. Defendant received its trust 
deed from certain individuals who received title from Great 
West Development Company. It follows that the world is informed 
by the record that plaintiffs' trust deed was prior to defendant's 
trust deed because defendant's granters received title after 
those same granters gave plaintiffs their trust deed. The only 
other alternative is that plaintiffs' granters gave title to 
defendant's granters and then gave plaintiffs an empty trust 
deed at a time when they no longer had title, a result that 
assumes a fradulent conveyance to plaintiffs by plaintiffs' 
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granter and defendant's grantor and which plaintiff claims is 
contrary to usual human experience and, therefore, is unreason-
able. 
Note all of the documents here relied upon were recorded 
at the same time, to wit: 11:02 a.m. on May 1, 1979. 
Plaintiff urges that the only, or certinly the most, rea-
sonable construction of the record title by this Court or by 
the world re:eorting to the record to determine title was that 
plaintiffs obtained their trust deed from their grantors prior 
to the time defendant received its trust deed from the grantees 
of plaintiffs' granters. 
If we consider the problem aside from :the record, it is 
clear the documents were in the hands of Utah ~itle Company who 
was instructed by Defendant, and, therefore, was defendant's 
agent, prior to the documents' being recorded. (See stipulated 
fact #6 (R-13)H, tit::follavs that the presumptions hereinabove urged 
regarding the record are the same or more emphatic aside from 
the record--that is, defendant or its agent, Utah Title, must 
have known that the only reasonable construction of the docu-
ments was that plaintiffs received their trust deed prior to de-
fendant's receiving its trust deed. Perhaps more importantly, 
the obvious expertise of defendant and its agent, Utah Title 
Company, and their opportunity to recognize the problem before 
recording and to correct it by obtaining a written subordina-
tion agreement from plaintiffs belies their claim that plaintiffs 
understood or agreed that defendant was to have a prior lien on 
lot 17 A-D. 
-7-
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ARGUMENT 
II 
IF PLAINTIFFS' TRUST DEED IS NOT PRIOR TO 
DEFENDANT"S TRUST DEED FOR THE REASONS URGED 
IN ARGUMENT I, PLAINTIFFS' TRUST DEED AND DE-
FENDANT'S TRUST DEED ARE CONTEMPORANEOUS PER 
THE RECORD BECAUSE THEY WERE RECORDED AT THE 
SAME TIME. 
This is the legal question about which the parties empha-
tically disagree. Plaintiffs' claim is as stated in the cap-
tioned Argument II. Defendant's claim is that because its 
trust deed, though recorded at exactly the same minute as Plain-
tiffs' trust deed, to wit: at 11:02 a.m. on May 1, 1979, was 
accorded lower recording number, it is prior. Defendant simply 
cites the statute saying the first deed recorded takes prece-
dence over subs_equent deeds recorded and then assumes the lower 
recording number indicates an earlier recording. But, while 
that analysis may be comforting to defendant, it is not support-
able, either practically or legally. Practically, if documents 
are received by the recorder at the same instant, one must be 
accorded a higher number than the other, but that is no reason 
to prefer one over the other by according it a higher priority. 
As to the law, UCA 57-3-2 is as follows: 
57-3-2 Record Imparts Notice. Every convey-
ance, or instrument in writing affecting real es-
tate, executed, acknowledged or proved, and certi-
fied, in the manner prescribed by this title, and 
every patent to land within this state duly executed 
and verified according to law, and every judgment, 
order or decree of any court of record in this state, 
or a copy thereof, required by law to be recorded in 
-a-
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the off ice of the county recorder shall, from the 
time of filing the same with the recorder for record, 
impart notice to all persons of the contents thereof; 
and subsequent purchasers, mortgagees and lien holders 
shall be deemed would purchase and take with notice. 
66 Am Jur 2nd, sections 153 to 155 of the title "Records and 
Recording Laws" describes the rule. A careful reading of sec-
tions 154 and 155 discloses that when the instruments are properly 
recorded within a reasonable time, the priorities will date from 
the time of filing. The point is made, somewhat brutally to de-
fendant's position, but nonetheless more clearly, in the case of 
Bonstein v~ Schweyer et al, 61 A 447, a 1905 Pennsylvania case. Af-
ter noting that it is not really a qu~stion, but must be passed 
upon because it had been raised, the Court said: 
These two mortgages were left at the office for record 
on the same day and at the same moment of time--9:30 
a.m., April 14, 1877. Neither had priority over the 
other. The lien of each commenced at precisely the same 
moment. There can be no answer to this in the face of 
the words of the statute, but the appellants contend, 
and with apparent seriousness, that the lien of the 
mortgage given to the widow was prior to that of the 
one given to the daughter, because, according to the 
pages in the mortgage book, it was recorded first. It 
was recorded on page 81, and other on page 83, and the 
position of the appellants, as they state it, is "that 
the paging in the mortgage book conclusively establishes 
the priority of entry," and therefore priority of lien. 
It was impossible to record the two mortgages at the same 
instant in the same mortgage book. One had to appear 
there first, but the page on which it appeared had 
nothing to do with its lien. That commenced the moment 
the arrival of the mortgage in the recorder's office was 
noted by the recorder, and in contemplation of law it 
was recorded from the moment it was left for record. 
As a matter of universal experience, we know that mort-
gages and deeds are not actually recorded as soon as they 
are brought into the office, because it is not possible 
to so record them. They accumulate in the off ice for 
record. Those brought first are first recorded, and in 
time all are recorded. Under the contention of the 
appellants, as it must be understood, no mortgagee is 
safe with the_ lien of his mortgage, as against other 
-9-
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other mortgagees, until his mortgage is actually recorded 
in the mortgage book. Of this proposition serious con-
sideration could hardly be expected, and certainly will 
not be given to it. 
While that is an old case, it did address the exact 
problem presented in this case in a direct way. Plaintiffs are 
not aware of any cases to the contrary and believe there are none. 
ARGUMENT 
III 
PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO PRIORITY BECAUSE THEIRS 
WAS A PURCHASE MONEY MORTGAGE. 
Apparently it is agreed that if plaintiffs' trust deed is 
fairly characterized as a. purchase money mortgage, it is prior 
and plaintiffs will not here reiterate the law of purchase money 
mortgages, except to note that it also is applicable to trust 
deeds. 
The problem is that plaintiffs in this case sold one lot 
of the. development and took a trust deed on another l.ot of the 
same development. Plaintiffs understood that Great West Develop-
ment Company, defendant's mortgagor needed clear title to lot 4 
A-D and made the exchange in that way to accommodate that need. 
Defendant has cited the rule as outlined in Am '1cr 2nd and simply 
asserted that this case does not fit. Plaintiffs acknowledge 
that the case is apparently one of first impression. 
The rule from 55 Am Jur 2nd Mortgages Section 348 is as 
follows: 
§348. Generally 
A mortgage on land executed to secure the purchase 
money by a purchaser of the land contemporaneously with 
the acquisition of the legal title thereto, or after-
ward, but as a part of the same transaction, is a pur-
chase money mortgage. 
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The black letter print rule in 58 CJS Section 231 a, of 
Mortgages is as follows: 
§231. Priority of Purchase-Money Mortgages 
a. In General. A mortgage given for unpaid pur-
chase money on a sale of land, as part of the same trans-
action as the deed, generally takes precedence over all 
other existing and subsequent claims and liens against 
the mortgagor. 
The statement in American Law of Property IV, Section 
16.106 E Purchase Money Mor~gages at page 220 is as follows: 
It is familiar learning that a purchase money mort-
gage, executed at the same time as the deed of purchase 
of land, or in pursuance of agreement as part of one 
continuous transaction, takes precedence over any other 
claim or lien attaching to the property through the 
vende.e-mortgagor. 
While it is fairly possible to make defendant's argument 
using the Am Jur 2nd definition because of the words "the land," 
it is impossible to make that argument from the CJS definition 
or the American Law of Property definition. Plaintiffs urge 
that the Am Jur 2nd definition would be as accurate if the word 
"the" in "the land 11 was omitted and that definition would then 
square with the other two. 
But let us talk about the purpose of the rule as applied 
to the facts of this case. Plaintiffs submit the purpose of the 
rule was to make it clear that mortgagees such as Plaintiffs re-
ceived their security interest ahead of claims against the mort-
gagor that attached automatically upon the vesting of title in 
that mortgagor, such as execution liens, welfare liens, dower, 
homestead interests or mortgages executed by the mortgagor pre-
viously in anticipation of receipt of title about which mort-
-11-
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gagees such as plaintiffs could not easily protect themselves 
for want of knowledge of such interests. In this case, defen-
dant asserts priority based upon a mortgage it received previous-
ly from a party who did not have title when it gave the trust 
d~ed to defendant as against a trust deed given to plaintiffs by 
the then owner of the property before it conveyed the property 
to the party who had given the trust deed to defendant. Note 
that if or when plaintiffs checked title before accepting their 
trust deed, their granter had clear title. Even if plaintiffs 
knew of defendant's trust deed, which plaintiffs do not concede, 
they would not have been concerned about it because the granter 
of that trust deed did not have title; plaintiffs' granter had 
title. 
Plaintiffs respectfully urge that they did have a purchase 
money mortgage under a proper definition of that phrase and that 
the reasons for the rule giving priority to purchase money mort-
gagees, such as plaintiffs, that is, to protect them from hidden 
interests that become effective only on a transfer of title that 
triggers the competing interest, exist in this case and require 
a recognition of plaintiffs' priority under the purchase money 
mortgage doctrine. 
ARGUMENT 
IV 
IF THE MATTER IS TO BE DETEF.MINED UPON THE BASIS 
OF THE SILENT OR EXPRESSED INTENTION OF THE PAR-
TIES, THERE IS A FACTUAL DISPUTE AND PLAINTIFFS 
ARE ENTITLED TO A TRIAL. 
-12-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Plaintiffs concede that if they agreed or consented that 
their claim would be subordinate, it is. They cannot dispute 
defendant's present claim that it intended to obtain priority, 
but they claim they did not acquiesce or agree to it and that 
defendant did not communicate it to them. If defendant origin-
ally intended that plaintiffs' claim be subordinate, it could 
easily have prepared an agreement to that effect. Such agree-
ments are usual and extensively used. But defendant did not 
propose or obtain such agreement. That it did not, strongly be-
lies its claim that such was intended or, at best, indicates it 
intended to obtain an advantage by s.ilent conduct. 
Defendant has seized upon plaintiffs' saying in their dep-
ositions that they understood that defendant wanted a first trust 
deed position as a concess.ion that plaintiffs agreed to subor-
dinate their trust deed. In the first place, plaintiffs' attorney 
would now stipulate that defendant wanted a first trust deed 
position--(After all, who doesn't?); but plaintiffs did not agree 
or consent that their trust deed would be subordinate to effect 
that result. Defendant's counsel at the same depositions, at-
tempted to establish such agreement, but without success. On 
page 18 (R 99) of Dirk Anderson's deposition the following ex-
change between Rappaport and Dirk Anderson occurred: 
Q (By Mr. Rappaport) Could you please answer the 
question? Did you understand that the trust deed that 
you and your wife and your mother and father were get-
ting for approximately $31,000 was going to be second 
to the trust deed of American Savings? 
A I understood that that was just to secure our money, 
that we would still have an interest in that property 
to secure our money. 
-13-
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Q Right. And you understood that American Savings 
wanted a first trust deed position on all the lots? 
A Right. 
Q And that you would be second to their trust deed? 
Your trust deed would be second to their trust deed? 
Did you understand that? 
A Well, all I understood was that was securing our 
money. 
That issue was picked up by Barnes at page 21 (R 102): 
Q Did you have an understanding about the financing? 
Would that also affect your lot? 
A Yeah. It would affect our lot. 
Q So you knew that they were buying back those lots 
so that they could obtain financing? 
A Right. 
Q And that that financing would also involve your lot; 
is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q What was your understanding about where you would fall 
in. line with the bank? Who would have a first interest, 
and who would have a second interest? 
A My understanding was that we would get paid off as 
soon as that building was built. 
Q But you were aware, also, that the reason for this 
whole deeding back and receiving an interest in the lot 
was so that the financing for the Myer project could be 
arranged? 
A Right. 
In' Clair Anderson's deposition at page 14 (R 131), Rappa-
port asked again, and again he got a negative answer: 
Q You were aware that the bank was going to be having 
a blanket loan on the whole project, and that your note 
and trust deed came after that? 
A I wasn't aware of that, no. 
-14-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
And at page 20 (R 137), he tried again: 
Q No one told you that you were going to be paid before 
the loan to American Savings was paid; is that right? 
A They never said anything about it. 
And at page 23 (R 140), he tried again: 
Q That the American Savings would have clear title and 
first position? 
A Well, I don't know about first position. 
Q But clear title? 
A Clear title. 
It is fa.ir to say that while plaintiffs in their depositions ac-
knowledged that defendant wanted clear title to lot 4 A-D to 
make their loan and that they wanted a first trust deed position, 
they consistently refused to agree, although badgered to, that 
they agreed to take or understood that defendant expected them 
to take a subordinate position. 
Moreover, had they explained to plaintiffs what they meant 
by a first trust deed position or asked them what they understood 
by the phrase "a first trust deed position," they would have dis-
covered that plaintiffs' understanding was simply that it was 
necessary to get title in all of the lots in common ownership 
and that anyone receiving a trust deed from that owner would have 
a first trust deed, and further, that that owner could then give 
any number of first trust deeds. See plaintiffs Clair Anderson's 
and Dirk Anderson's Affidavits attached hereto (R 72-75), and 
see plaintiffs' explanations of their answers given at the time 
of deposition. 
Plaintiffs are reluctant to assert a semantic misunder-
standing in defense of defendant's claims, but feel they must 
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because the misunderstanding exists. They also claim that, ab-
sent that misunderstanding, all they conceded was a knowledge 
that defendant wanted a first trust deed position--a concession 
they would still make. Plaintiffs further contend that their 
persistant denial of the further questions as to whether they 
intended to take or even that they understood defendant intended 
them to take a s.ubordinate position should have alerted defen-
dant's counsel to the communication failure. 
Plaintiffs also deny the claim in Bruce Hancey's Affida-
vit (R 19) that that matter was explained to them. While Dirk 
Anderson agreed that Myers coul.d have explained that defendant 
wanted a first trust deed position, he denies that Myers or any-
one explained that plaintiffs' position was to be subordinate. 
(R 74-75) 
Plaintiffs urge the Court that if American Savings or its 
agent Utah Title intended that plaintiffs should have a subordin-
ate position, they could have and should have said so in writing. 
Both of said institutions are highly expert in dealing adequately 
with this kind of transaction and knew how to memorialize the 
agreement that they now claim existed. That they didn't, strongly 
belies their claim. 
Plaintiffs further urge that defendant or its agent Utah 
Title prepared the documents and recorded them. If they are 
ambiguous, that ambiguity should be resolved against defendant. 
Plaintiffs urge the Court to decide the matter based on the ob-
jective non-colorable record that is available to it: that is, 
upon the records of the County Recorder's office. It is some-
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how unbecoming of these giants, American Savings and Utah Title, 
who controlled the creation of the documents and the recording 
of them to now say they intended, by a sneaky procedure, to put 
plaintiffs in a second lien position, even though an analysis 
of the record at the time plaintiffs took their trust deed would 
have suggested they were getting a first lien position. But 
since they have failed to accomplish that sneaky result, they 
now ask the Court to decide that plaintiffs intended all along 
to get something less than the record, controlled by defendant, 
gave them. Aside from its uncomliness, it is untrue. Plaintiffs 
never agreed or intended their trust deed to be subordinate to 
defendant's. 
ARGUMENT 
v 
PLAINTIFFS' FOURTH CAUSEOF ACTION IS NOT IN 
POSITION TO BE DECIDED BY SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Plaintiffs understand another group of parties has sued 
defendant upon a claim similar to that addressed in plaintiffs' 
fourth claim. Plaintiffs have asserted that claim because they 
are in the same class as the other parties, but have not yet 
initiated discovery regarding that claim. Counsel for both par-
ties agreed to cooperate to dispose of plaintiffs' first three 
claims by stipulating to the facts that affect them and testing 
the matter by a Motion for Sununary Judgment. That is where 
plaintiffs' energies have been directed. They still want an 
opportunity to discover the facts respecting their fourth claim. 
Defendant has exaggerated plaintiffs' unconcern and lack 
of information regarding their fourth claim. At page 18-19 of 
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Dirk Anderson 1 s deposition (R 99-100), Rappaport asked and Dirk 
answered as follows: 
Q I'd like to ask you the same question concerning 
the fourth claim of your complaint. I'd appreciate 
it if you haven't before, if you could read paragraphs 
19, 20, and 21. Can you tell us what specific facts 
you know or have heard of that support the allegations 
in paragraphs 19, 20 and 21? 
A Spring of '78 -- '77. When I met those two 
after trying to meet with them several times,- that's 
what they indicated; that they were having a problem, 
and that American Savings had agreed to give them the 
money, but they were holding up on their draws, and 
they couldn't get any money to finish the project. 
Q Did they say why American was holding up on its 
draws? 
A No. 
Q So that's all that you know is that Larry Myers 
and Larry Price said American was holding up on the 
draws? 
A Yes. 
That is all of Rappaport's examination about plaintiffs' 
fourth claim. All of Barnes' examination related to the time 
of closing. Dirk's answers indicated only his understanding at 
that time. It is much afterward that plaintiffs claim that de-
fendant failed to perform its agreement. 
Plaintiffs both testified as to some knowledge of de-
fendant's promises to finance the developer even at the time of 
the closing (R 99 and R 141) • They were informed in substan-
tially more detail at a later time and still wish to investigate 
the facts of that matter further. 
Dirk's father testified that he relied on Dirk in this 
transaction. He further testified that he understood generally 
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that defendant had agreed to the development loan and that he 
had been advised by the developer that defendant had failed to 
make disbursements and the development failed because of that. 
(See Deposition, pages 24-25.) (R 141-142) Clair Anderson's 
answer that he didn't care about the financing or the specific 
arrangements is not referenced in time. It appears to admit 
an unconcern and lack of knowledge at the time of the closing 
and has been corrected to show that. 
CONCLUSION 
1. Plaintiffs' trust deed is prior to defendant's trust 
deed and that priority is observable from the record because it 
was given to plaintiffs by a party prior in title to the party 
that gave the trust deed to defendant. 
2. If plaintiffs' trust deed is not prior, it is contem-
poraneous because it was recorded at the same time as defendant's 
trust deed. 
3. Plaintiffs' trust deed is entitled to priority because 
it is a purchase money mortgage. 
4. Plaintiffs did not agree to, consent to or acquiesce 
to take a subordinate position to defendant. 
5. Plaintiffs have not initiated discovery per their 
fourth claim, but still intend to do so. They have not admitted 
or conceded their claim away. The matter is not in a posture to 
be determined by Summary Judgment at this time. 
Plaintiffs respectfully urge the Court to rule or to in-
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struct the lower court to rule that the record title of plaintiffs' 
trust deed is prior to defendant's trust deed; or, in the alterna-
tive, that such record title is contemporaneous. 
Inasmuch as Judge Taylor's decision is unexplained, plain-
tiffs believe they will be required to file a reply memorandum 
after they discover how defendant justifies Judge Taylor's deci-
sion. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GERALD E. NIELSON 
Attorney for Plaintiffs Anderson 
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